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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a large class of Texas mineral owners were underpaid
royalties by their lessor, Big Corp. Oil & Gas Co. (“Big Corp.”). Seek-
ing redress, these individuals timely file a class action lawsuit in a
Texas federal court, asserting breach of contract claims against Big
Corp. After extensive motion practice, class certification is ultimately
denied. The putative members of that class action lawsuit now file in-
dividual breach of contract claims in a Texas state court against Big
Corp. However, the four-year statute of limitations applicable to their
breach of contract claims has since expired. Or has it?1 Does a class
action lawsuit filed in a federal court located in Texas that asserts
Texas property-related claims toll the statute of limitations for the pu-
tative members of that class?
This Comment seeks to clarify the scope of cross-jurisdictional toll-
ing in Texas. Although both Texas and federal courts interpreting
Texas law have addressed this issue, no Texas court has specifically
addressed whether putative members of a class action lawsuit—which
was filed in a federal court located in Texas and that asserts Texas
property-related claims—can rely on the class action lawsuit to toll the
statute of limitations applicable to their claims. Part I of this Com-
ment provides a brief history of the class action tolling doctrine, spe-
cifically describing American Pipe and its progeny. Part II discusses
recent Texas case law decisions on the American Pipe doctrine and
their applicability when cross-jurisdictional tolling is involved. Part III
briefly discusses the policy concerns behind cross-jurisdictional tolling.
Part IV recommends that Texas should adopt cross-jurisdictional toll-
ing in property-related cases, especially when the class action lawsuit is
filed in a federal court located in Texas. Finally, Part V summarizes
the points discussed in this Comment.
1. This hypothetical is largely based off a problem presented by David Bober in
his article on cross-jurisdictional tolling. See David Bober, Cross-Jurisdictional Toll-
ing: When and Whether a State Court Should Toll Its Statute of Limitations Based on
the Filing of a Class Action in Another Jurisdiction, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 617,
617–18 (2002).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION TOLLING:
AMERICAN PIPE AND ITS PROGENY
The American Pipe doctrine provides that the filing of a class action
lawsuit tolls the statute of limitations as to all purported members of
the class who wait to file suit, not just those who file motions to inter-
vene.2 This section briefly describes the cases that created (and ex-
tended) the American Pipe doctrine.
A. The Case That Started It All: American Pipe & Construction
Company v. Utah (1974)
In American Pipe, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari of a case to decide whether the filing of a class action lawsuit
tolled the claims of the individual class members.3 The Supreme Court
stated that “[a] federal class action is no longer ‘an invitation to join-
der’ but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than en-
courage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”4 If
plaintiffs therefore assert claims that are “‘typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class’ and would ‘fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class,’” they should stand as parties to the suit until they
received notice of the suit or chose not to continue in the suit.5 The
Court ruled that the commencement of the class action tolled the stat-
ute of limitations for all putative members who might later wish to
participate in the suit.6
The Court reasoned that “to hold contrary would frustrate the prin-
ciple functions of the class suit” because it would force putative mem-
bers to file motions to join or intervene in order to assure their
participation in the judgment—“precisely the multiplicity of activity
which Rule 23 was designed to avoid in those cases where a class ac-
tion is found ‘superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy.’”7 The Court then extended this
principle to “those members of the class who did not rely upon the
commencement of the class action (or who were even unaware that
such a suit existed)” because potential class members are “passive
beneficiaries of the action brought on their behalf” during the pen-
dency of the District Court’s determination on class certification.8
Therefore, the Court held that “the later running of the applicable
statute of limitations [while waiting on class certification] does not bar
2. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–55 (1974).
3. Id. at 545.
4. Id. at 545–50.
5. Id. at 550–51.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 551–52.
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participation in the class,” even for asserted members of the class who
were unaware of the proceedings brought in their interest.9
In adopting the American Pipe tolling doctrine, the Supreme Court
emphasized that such a tolling rule “is in no way inconsistent with the
functional operations of a statute of limitations.”10 Moreover, the
Court emphasized that the policies underlying the statute of limita-
tions are not broken when “a named plaintiff who is found to be rep-
resentative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies the
defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against
them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential
plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.”11 This is because the
defendants will have all the information necessary to determine the
subject matter and size of the potential litigation, and the manner in
which the suit will be tried within the period set by limitations.12
B. American Pipe’s Progeny: Crown, Cork & Seal Company, Inc.
v. Parker (1983)
The Supreme Court extended the American Pipe doctrine in
Crown, Cork & Seal (“Crown”) to include not just members of the
putative class and intervenors, but also individuals who timely sought
to bring individual actions after class certification was denied.13 The
Court began its analysis by explaining that there are numerous rea-
sons why putative class members, after denial of class certification,
might prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene: (1) in-
convenient forums; (2) control over litigation; and (3) the possibility
that their motion to intervene would be denied.14 These putative class
members have every incentive to file an individual suit prior to the
expiration of their own limitations period.15 The Court explained that
if the American Pipe doctrine did not apply in these instances, it
would result in “a needless multiplicity of actions being filed—pre-
cisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the
American Pipe doctrine were designed to avoid.”16
The Supreme Court further stated that this rule would not be an
aberration of the policies underlying the statute of limitations—charg-
ing defendants with notice of adverse claims and preventing plaintiffs
from sleeping on their rights—because “these ends are met when a
class action is commenced.”17 This is because the class complaint “no-
tifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought
9. Id. at 552.
10. Id. at 554.
11. Id. at 554–55.
12. Id. at 555.
13. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349–52 (1983).
14. Id. at 350.
15. Id. at 350–51.
16. Id. at 351.
17. Id. at 352–53.
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against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the po-
tential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.”18
III. AMERICAN PIPE Tolling in Texas and Its Discord with
Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling
Both American Pipe and Crown involved class action lawsuits that
were filed in federal court, and asserted federal causes of action.19
However, these cases did not decide the issue of cross-jurisdictional
tolling—whether a state’s statute of limitations is tolled pending a
class certification decision in another jurisdiction (state or federal).20
This Section briefly explains the case that brought the American Pipe
doctrine to Texas, and subsequent cases that attempted to rely on
American Pipe for cross-jurisdictional tolling.
A. Bringing American Pipe to Texas: Grant v. Austin Bridge
Construction Company (1987)
In Grant, property owners alleged that Austin Bridge contracted
with the State of Texas to build a highway south of Huntsville, Texas.21
Heavy rains caused sediment from the construction site to pour into a
subdivision and nearby lake that the property owners had the exclu-
sive right to occupy for recreational use.22 The property owners
claimed this exclusive right to occupy was damaged and brought a
class action lawsuit against Austin Bridge.23 Austin Bridge claimed
that, during the pendency of the case, the statute of limitations ran on
the cause of action of the unnamed class members.24 The court held
that even though the statute of limitations on a class member’s indi-
vidual cause of action would expire during the pendency of the class
action, the statute of limitations remained tolled for all members of
the class until certification was denied.25 The court came to this con-
clusion by reasoning that Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and any federal decisions interpreting class action proce-
dures provided authoritative guidance for the court.26
The decision in Grant, therefore, brought the American Pipe doc-
trine to Texas courts by holding that “a state class action lawsuit seek-
18. Id.
19. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–55 (1974); Parker, 462 U.S.
at 347–49; Gerald D. Jowers, Jr., The Class Stops the Clock, 41–NOV TRIAL 18, 25
(Nov. 2005).
20. Jowers, supra note 19, at 25.
21. Grant v. Austin Bridge Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 367–68 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
22. Id. at 368.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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ing property damages tolled the statute of limitations for all potential
class members’ individual claims, pending a decision on class
certification.”27
B. The Struggle Between the American Pipe Doctrine and
Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling
After the Texas Supreme Court adopted the American Pipe doc-
trine for use in Texas courts, several Texas and federal cases began
exploring the reach of this doctrine. This Subsection explains the cases
that have shaped Texas law on cross-jurisdictional tolling. Although
the following cases indicate Texas does not permit cross-jurisdictional
tolling, they do suggest that this thought is not without exceptions.
1. Bell v. Show Denko K.K. (1995)
In Bell, an individual brought a personal injury lawsuit in a Texas
court against Showa Denko, K.K. (“Denko”) on September 16, 1992
for injuries she attributed to her ingestion of a dietary supplement.28
Denko filed for summary judgment, claiming that Bell’s suit was not
timely filed.29 Relying on the decision in Grant, Bell argued that a
mass personal injury class action lawsuit filed in a federal court lo-
cated in New Mexico—and predicated on New Mexico law—tolled
the statute of limitations.30 The Court held that Grant did not go so far
as to hold that “the filing of a mass personal injury suit, in federal
court, in another state, with the variety of claims necessarily involved
in such a case, entitled a plaintiff to a tolling of the limitations period
such as in American Pipe,” and that such a holding was not warranted
by the Grant decision.31 The court reasoned that in Grant, the suit was
filed in a Texas state court and involved “a readily discernable group
of people claiming injury to certain property rather than personal in-
jury,” and that such a distinction is important in determining whether
the defendants have fair notice of the existence of a claim by filing the
class action lawsuit.32
2. Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K. (1997)
In Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., Vaught brought a products liabil-
ity action in Texas state court against the same defendant as in Bell,
Showa Denko, K.K. (“Denko”) on April 28, 1993 for injuries she at-
27. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining
Grant v. Austin Bridge Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ)).
28. Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995,
writ denied).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 756–57.
31. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
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tributed to her ingestion of a nutritional supplement.33 Vaught’s case
was removed to federal court, and a Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”)
Panel subsequently ordered the action transferred to the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina to be joined
with similar pending lawsuits.34 Denko moved for summary judgment
on limitations grounds, and Vaught claimed that her potential mem-
bership in two mass personal injury federal class action lawsuits filed
in Maryland, and subsequently transferred to the same MDL panel in
which Vaught’s suit was pending, tolled the statute of limitations.35
The court reasoned that “[w]hether a state statute of limitations would
be tolled by a federal class action” was a question of state law36 and
that Texas’s tolling rule operates as follows:
A state (Texas) class action that raises property damage-type claims
tolls a Texas statute of limitations pending a certification ruling.
And, consistent with our understanding of this Texas tolling rule, it
is unclear whether, under this rule, a federal class action filed in
Texas or in any other State would ever toll a Texas statute of limita-
tions, regardless of the type of claims raised.37
Thus, the court held that cross-jurisdictional tolling was not
permissible.38
3. Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (2001)
In Prieto v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, an in-
dependent insurance agent sold a life insurance policy belonging to
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Hancock”) to Brett
Davis and convinced him to put it in a trust managed by Angelo
Prieto.39 Based on the insurance agent’s representations, Brett contin-
ued to make premium payments.40 When interest rates declined in the
1980s, a federal class action lawsuit was filed in Maryland against
Hancock—in which plaintiffs41 were members—because dividends to
policy holders were reduced.42 After a proposed settlement was
reached, plaintiffs subsequently opted out of the class and filed an in-
dividual lawsuit against Hancock, alleging injuries categorized as “ec-
onomic loss.”43 The plaintiffs contended that the statute of limitations
should be tolled by the filing of the federal class action lawsuit filed in
33. Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1139–40 (5th Cir. 1997).
34. Id. at 1140.
35. Id. at 1143.
36. Id. at 1147 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509–11 (N.D.
Tex. 2001), abrogated by Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 463 (5th Cir. 2008).
40. Prieto, 132 F. Supp. at 511.
41. Plaintiffs were Brett Davis and Angelo Prieto. Id.
42. Id. at 511.
43. Id. at 517, 518 n.14.
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Maryland.44 The court stated in dicta that Texas courts, if presented
with the issue, would likely interpret the class action tolling rule of
Grant and Bell as extending to all property damage claims, regardless
of the forum in which the class action was filed.45 The court therefore
reasoned that because the class’s claims for “economic loss” were sim-
ilar to property damage claims in that the type and potential number
of claims can easily be determined, the class action lawsuit tolled the
statute of limitations.46
4. Newby v. Enron Corp. (2008)47
In Newby, Fleming & Associates (“Fleming”) filed seven securities-
related lawsuits in Texas state courts against various Enron-related de-
fendants seeking restraining orders to prevent defendants from de-
stroying Enron-related documents.48 Because the district court had
already issued a similar order against the same defendants,49 the dis-
trict court issued a memorandum enjoining Fleming from filing any
new Enron-related actions without leave of court.50 Fleming filed a
motion for leave to file two Enron-related actions and a motion to lift
the injunction; the former was granted, and the latter was denied.51
Meanwhile, the district court certified the Newby class action.52 Flem-
ing subsequently moved for leave to file thirty-four Enron-related
lawsuits in Texas courts, but the district court denied the motion, stat-
ing that the statute of limitations had run.53 Relying on Grant, Vaught,
and Bell, the court held that the district court was correct in conclud-
ing that the Newby federal securities fraud class action lawsuit filed in
Texas did not toll plaintiffs’ Texas law securities claims.54 The court
further stated that claimants were “free to pursue this argument with
Texas courts,” so the state courts can clarify the reach of Texas’s toll-
ing rules.55
44. Id. at 517.
45. Id. at 518.
46. Id. at 518 n.14.
47. Providing no reasoning as to why, Newby effectively overruled Prieto. Newby
v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 463 (5th Cir. 2008).
48. Id. at 466–67.
49. The district court had jurisdiction over the various Enron-related cases as part




52. Id. The Newby class action involved similar Enron-related securities claims
and was certified by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 236 F.R.D. 313, 320 (S.D. Tex. 2006), rev’d sub nom.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir.
2007).
53. Newby, 542 F.3d at 467–68.
54. Id. at 472; see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 722 (S.D. Tex.
2006).
55. Newby, 542 F.3d at 472.
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5. In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litigation (2014)
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
recently addressed the scope of Texas’s views on cross-jurisdictional
tolling in a case involving negligent misrepresentation claims.56 The In
re BP court, looking to the analysis in Bell, stated that the availability
of tolling appears to depend on the following context-specific ques-
tions: (1) whether the same defendant involved in both the class ac-
tion and the later-filed suit; (2) whether the class action gave the
defendant sufficient notice of the type of claim(s) asserted in the later-
filed individual suit; and (3) whether the class action gave defendant
sufficient notice of the potential number of claims that could be as-
serted against it.57 The court further stated that although “the Fifth
Circuit has cited Bell for the proposition that a federal class action
lawsuit likely cannot toll the state statute of limitations for a claim
filed in state court—i.e., that Texas does not recognize ‘cross-jurisdic-
tional tolling,’”58 the court “ha[d] some doubts that Bell reaches as far
as the Fifth Circuit has intimated.”59 However, the court ultimately
held that cross-jurisdictional tolling did not apply because it was
“bound to adopt and apply the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.”60
IV. THE POLICY CONCERNS COURTS HAVE WITH TEXAS’S
CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING RULE
Although the analyses in the aforementioned cases do not shed
much light on the policy concerns of cross-jurisdictional tolling, it is
helpful to examine these concerns in order to understand why states
are so hesitant to adopt such a doctrine. This Section briefly describes
those policy concerns.
A. Judicial Efficiency and Economy
The primary reason for the Supreme Court’s decision in American
Pipe was judicial efficiency and economy.61 The Court stated that re-
fusing to allow potential class members to join after limitations had
expired “would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and
economy of litigation which is a principle purpose of the procedure.”62
This “would breed needless duplications of motions” as it would re-
quire “[p]otential class members . . . to file protective motions to inter-
vene or to join in the event that the class was later found
unsuitable.”63 As such, American Pipe tolling is a logical solution to
56. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 3d 693, 698–700 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
57. Id. at 699–700.
58. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Bober, supra note 1, at 620, 620 n.21.
62. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
63. Id. at 553–54.
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this problem “when both the class and the individual action are
brought in the same court system.”64
“However, in the cross-jurisdictional context, it is uncertain what
interests in judicial efficiency a forum state would gain by tolling its
statute of limitations based on the filing of a class action outside the
jurisdiction.”65 If a state permits class members to use cross-jurisdic-
tional tolling, plaintiffs are incentivized to stay in the class.66 Plaintiffs
would remain in the class because they could always file an individual
action in the state if class certification was ultimately denied because
the statute of limitations applicable to their claims would be tolled by
the out-of-state action.67 This would further the efficiency and econ-
omy of both the forum state and the extra-jurisdictional state by
preventing mass filings of protective motions to intervene or join.68 If,
however, certification is ultimately denied, the forum state would ex-
perience an inundation of motions from all over the country by indi-
viduals who wish to bring their claim as the state’s cross-jurisdictional
laws would permit the statute of limitations to be tolled by the out-of-
state class action.69 Such a result would obliterate the reasoning be-
hind the American Pipe doctrine as it “would breed needless duplica-
tions of motions.”70
B. Notice to Defendants
In adopting the American Pipe doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that such a tolling rule “is in no way inconsistent
with the functional operations of a statute of limitations”71—charging
defendants with notice of adverse claims and preventing plaintiffs
from sleeping on their rights. Cross-jurisdictional tolling has been crit-
icized by defendants because it has been said to provide them with
inadequate notice of the existence, type, and potential number of the
claims asserted against them.72 Specifically, the Bell and Vaught courts
noted that the defendants were not given fair notice because plaintiffs
were alleging a personal injury claim from a product that the compa-
nies had put into mass production all over the United States.73
64. Bober, supra note 1, at 640–41.
65. Id. at 641.
66. Id. at 641–42.
67. Id. at 642.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see, e.g., Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1998)
(“Tolling a state statute of limitations during the pendency of a federal class action,
however, may actually increase the burden on that state’s court system, because plain-
tiffs from across the country may elect to file a subsequent suit in that state solely to
take advantage of the generous tolling rule.”).
70. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1974).
71. Id. at 554.
72. Bober, supra note 1, at 645.
73. Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995,
writ denied); Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1144–47 (5th Cir. 1997).
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V. CLARIFYING THE SCOPE OF TEXAS’S CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL
TOLLING RULE
Several circuit courts from across the country, including one federal
court interpreting Texas law, have identified five factors that are gen-
erally examined in determining whether a state will permit claimants
to use cross-jurisdictional tolling.  The factors discussed in these cases,
along with the established Texas law on cross-jurisdictional tolling,
suggest that Texas would permit cross-jurisdictional tolling in limited
circumstances. This Subsection explains that applying cross-jurisdic-
tion tolling in these limited circumstances would not create the policy
concerns that states struggle with in deciding to adopt cross-jurisdic-
tional tolling.
A. The Factors Weigh in Favor of Adopting a Limited Form of
Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling
In determining whether a federal class action lawsuit filed in a state
court will toll that particular state’s statute of limitations, courts gen-
erally consider the following factors: “(1) whether a class action rule
modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has been adopted
by the state; (2) whether the state allows class action tolling in its juris-
diction; (3) whether the state permits cross-jurisdictional tolling for
individual cases; (4) whether the state applies common law tolling;
and (5) the state’s policies.”74
1. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 Is Modeled After Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23
One key factor courts consider in applying the American Pipe doc-
trine to effectuate cross-jurisdictional tolling is whether the state’s
74. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (citing
Jowers, supra note 19, at 25); see, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D.
335, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (examining, in an anti-trust action, the issue of cross-jurisdic-
tional class action tolling, the court discussed “(1) the federal interest in tolling the
state statutes of limitations; (2) whether the highest court of the state has or would
adopt cross-jurisdictional class action tolling for antitrust class actions filed in federal
courts; (3) whether plaintiffs’ state law claims are sufficiently similar to plaintiffs fed-
eral claims to toll the state statutes of limitations; and (4) the prejudice suffered by
defendants if the Court tolls the statutes of limitations.”); Wade v. Danek Medical,
Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that because Virginia had not
adopted class action tolling, did not have a state class action rule analogous to FED. R.
CIV. P 23, and did not favor common law equitable tolling, Virginia would not apply
cross-jurisdictional tolling and the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred); In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 183 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming district court ruling
denying American Pipe tolling of limitations in a price-fixing action where a related
class action was pending because Florida law specifies exclusive list of conditions that
can toll running of statute of limitations and makes clear that “[n]o disability or other
reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations”).
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class action rule is modeled after the federal class action rule.75 It is
evident that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 (“TRCP 42”) was
modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“FRCP 23”).76 In
fact, even Grant—the case that brought the American Pipe doctrine to
Texas—began its reasoning with the fact that “[r]ule 42 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure is patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure” and that “federal decision interpreting class
action procedures [should therefore] provide authoritative guidance
for Texas courts.”77
In fact, TRCP 42 was amended to conform to the subsequent
amendments to FRCP 23.78 Because the two rules are almost identi-
cal, authority regarding FRCP 23 should be persuasive on questions
involving TRCP 42.79 Therefore, Texas courts should adopt the Amer-
ican Pipe doctrine to effectuate cross-jurisdictional tolling. The Ameri-
can Pipe Doctrine should be applied narrowly, such as in the
circumstances presented in the hypothetical at the beginning of this
Article: a federal class action lawsuit filed in Texas asserting Texas law
breach of contract claims arising from royalty interests located in
Texas, to which Texas limitations apply.
75. Jowers, supra note 19, at 25; see also Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382,
393 (5th Cir. 2005) (declining to permit tolling, noting among other things that “Mis-
sissippi does not have class actions”).
76. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 663 n.6 (Tex. 2004)
(“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23; consequently, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current federal class
action requirements are persuasive authority.”); Sw. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22
S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000) (“Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs
class certification. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42. The rule is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current fed-
eral class action requirements are persuasive authority.”); American Express Travel
Related Servs. Co. v. Walton, 883 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ)
(“Rule 42 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Federal rule 23 and
the cases interpreting it are persuasive authority when we interpret rule 42.”).
77. Grant v. Austin Bridge Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
78. Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2000) (“Texas Rule 42,
adopted in 1941 and patterned after the federal rule, was also revised in 1977 to con-
form to the 1966 federal amendments.”).
79. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 663 n.6 (“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 is patterned
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and authori-
ties interpreting current federal class action requirements are persuasive authority.”);
Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433 (“Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs
class certification. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42. The rule is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current fed-
eral class action requirements are persuasive authority.”); Walton, 883 S.W.2d at 708
(“Rule 42 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Federal rule 23 and
the cases interpreting it are persuasive authority when we interpret rule 42.”).
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2. Texas Allows Class Action Tolling
In Grant, the court held that the statute of limitations remained
tolled for all members of the class until certification was denied.80 The
court came to this conclusion by reasoning that Rule 42 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure was patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and any federal decisions interpreting class
action procedures provided authoritative guidance for the court. Id.
The decision in Grant therefore brought the American Pipe doctrine
to Texas courts by holding that “a state class action lawsuit seeking
property damages tolled the statute of limitations for all potential
class members’ individual claims, pending a decision on class
certification.”81
3. Texas Has Not Yet Fully Developed Cross-Jurisdictional
Tolling Law
Although Texas courts and courts applying Texas law have ruled
that cross-jurisdictional tolling is not permitted in certain types of
cases, they have also stated that there is not an outright bar to cross-
jurisdictional tolling and that claimants are “free to pursue this argu-
ment with Texas courts,” so the state courts can clarify the reach of
Texas’s tolling rules.82 Thus, Texas has indicated that its rule on cross-
jurisdictional tolling is not yet fully developed. The reason Texas’s law
is not yet fully developed is because it left open the possibility that
claimants who have Texas property-related claims may rely on a fed-
eral class action lawsuit filed in Texas that asserts similar property re-
lated claims.83
4. Texas’s Adoption of Common-Law Tolling Demonstrates the
Acceptance of Equitably Proposed Procedural Devices
Like Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling
If state courts are hospitable to applying equitably proposed proce-
dural devices in determining whether the statute of limitations is
80. Grant, 725 S.W.2d at 370.
81. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining
Grant, 725 S.W.2d at 370).
82. Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2008); In re BP P.L.C. Sec.
Litig., 51 F. Supp. 3d 693, 700 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
83. See Grant, 725 S.W.2d at 370 (holding that American Pipe tolling was appro-
priate when property damage claim was involved); Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (stating in dicta that Texas courts,
if presented with the issue, would likely interpret the class action tolling rule of Grant
and Bell as extending to all property damage claims, regardless of the forum in which
the class action was filed), abrogated by Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463 (5th Cir.
2008); Newby, 542 F.3d at 472 (stating that claimants are “free to pursue this argu-
ment with Texas courts,” so the state courts can clarify the reach of Texas’s tolling
rules); In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 3d at 700 (stating that the court “ha[d]
some doubts that Bell reaches as far as the Fifth Circuit has intimated.”).
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tolled or deferred, then it is more likely that states will accept cross-
jurisdictional tolling as it is also an equitably proposed procedural de-
vice to toll the statute of limitations.84 Texas does just that. Texas fol-
lows common-law tolling principles such as the discovery rule and the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment85 to defer the accrual of a cause of
action until the plaintiff either knows or, by exercising reasonable dili-
gence, should know of the facts giving rise to the claim.86 Because
Texas is hospitable to equitably proposed procedural devices—such as
the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment—it
should be more inclined to adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling, but in
very limited circumstances, like the hypothetical posed in this
Article.87
5. The State’s Policies Are in Favor of Applying the American
Pipe Doctrine to Class Action Lawsuits Filed in Texas
Federal Courts and Applying Texas
Property Law
The purpose of a statute of limitations is “to put defendants on no-
tice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their
rights.”88 In analyzing Grant, both the Vaught and Bell courts placed
particular emphasis on the fact that the defendant must be put on no-
tice of the “type and potential number of claims against it” in order
for the American Pipe doctrine to apply.89 The Vaught and Bell courts
determined that the American Pipe doctrine applied in Grant because
the class action lawsuit was filed in Texas, interpreting Texas property
law, and involving a Texas statute of limitations.90 Although the rea-
soning in Grant does not apply to a class action lawsuit filed in federal
court in another state, or in a federal court in Texas applying non-
property related claims,91 it should apply to class action lawsuits filed
84. Jowers, supra note 19, at 25.
85. Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 367 n.6 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett,
J., dissenting) (referring to “common-law tolling principles such as the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule.”).
86. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996).
87. Jowers, supra note 19, at 25.
88. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983); Little v.
Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. 1997).
89. Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1144 (5th Cir. 1997); Bell v.
Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
90. Vaught, 107 F.3d at 1144; Bell, 899 S.W.2d at 758.
91. See Grant v. Austin Bridge Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Ct. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (applying the American Pipe doctrine to use a
property-related class action lawsuit filed in Texas to toll a similar property-related
claim filed in Texas state court); Bell, 899 S.W.2d at 758 (refusing to apply the Ameri-
can Pipe doctrine to a mass personal injury federal class action lawsuit filed in New
Mexico to toll a similar personal injury claim filed in Texas state court); Vaught, 107
F.3d at 1147 (refusing to apply the American Pipe doctrine to multiple mass tort fed-
eral class action lawsuits filed in Maryland to toll a product liability claim filed in
Texas state court); Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2008) (refusing
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in federal courts located in Texas and applying Texas property law
claims because such an action would put defendants on notice of the
“type and potential number” of adverse claims against it.
B. Reconciling Previous Cases
Grant, the seminal case that brought the American Pipe tolling doc-
trine to Texas, concerned individual property owners with property
damage claims who sought to use a class action lawsuit filed in Texas
that asserted similar property damage claims to toll the Texas statute
of limitations.92 Allowing Texas property owners who have property-
related claims to use a federal class action lawsuit filed in Texas that
asserted similar Texas property-related claims to toll the Texas statute
of limitations is almost identical to the tolling concept in Grant. The
only difference is that the Texas property owners in the latter scenario
are relying on a class action lawsuit filed in another jurisdiction—a
federal court—to toll their state-law claims. However, this distinction
is immaterial because the federal court the claimants are relying on
would be located in Texas and “federal courts apply state statutes of
limitations and related state law governing tolling of the limitations
period” in diversity cases.93
This distinction should further be considered immaterial because
class action lawsuits are almost futile in Texas, and claimants are
therefore forced to file their class action lawsuits in federal court.94
After all, filing a class action lawsuit in a federal court located in Texas
is about as close as claimants can come to filing their class action law-
suit in Texas while still having a reasonable opportunity at seeing the
class certified.95
In addition to the similarities with the Grant case, the hypothetical
presented in this Article eliminates the concern discussed in the Bell
and Vaught cases: that the defendants were not given fair notice of the
type and potential number of claims asserted against them because
the plaintiffs were alleging personal injury claims from a product the
companies put into mass production all over the United States.96
However, courts addressing Texas’s rule on cross-jurisdictional tolling
to apply the American Pipe doctrine to a securities federal class action lawsuit filed in
Texas to toll a similar securities claim filed in Texas state court).
92. Grant, 725 S.W.2d at 367–70.
93. Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 869 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1989).
94. See Alistair Dawson & Geoff Gannaway, In Memoriam: Texas Class Actions,
72 TEX. B.J. 366, 367 (2009) (“The balance has tipped so far against Texas class ac-
tions that cases either are not filed at all, or are filed in alternative forums—across
state borders in Oklahoma and Arkansas, and even in federal courts.”).
95. Id.
96. Vaught, 107 F.3d at 1144–47; Bell, 899 S.W.2d at 758.
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have explained that this concern is eliminated if the claims asserted
involve property located within the state.97
C. Eliminating Policy Concerns
Moreover, the policy concerns surrounding cross-jurisdictional toll-
ing would be eliminated if Texas allowed cross-jurisdictional tolling
only in cases where claimants rely on federal class action lawsuits that
assert Texas property-related claims, especially if the class action law-
suit was filed in a federal court located in Texas. Such a scenario
would reduce the number of people that could file claims because
each person’s claim must be related to the specific property located
within that state. Said another way (and using the hypothetical posed
at the beginning of this Article), unless claimants own royalty interests
from gas produced within a specific shale formation found in Texas,
they cannot later claim the benefit of the tolling doctrine. Because the
claims would be based on a finite number of plaintiffs who own prop-
erty interests in a specific region of the state, there would not be an
influx of claims from across the country—like there was in the afore-
mentioned mass torts, securities, and personal injury cases98—by indi-
viduals who wish to take advantage of Texas’s cross-jurisdictional
tolling rule. After all, the claims can only belong to property owners
located in a specific region within Texas as opposed to any individual
from the United States who may have used a specific product.99
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Several factors indicate that Texas should adopt cross-jurisdictional
tolling in property-related cases: (1) the initial case which brought the
American Pipe doctrine to Texas involved a property-related class ac-
tion lawsuit filed in Texas; (2) no Texas case (or federal case interpret-
ing Texas law)100 has ever specifically addressed whether a property-
97. See Grant, 725 S.W.2d at 370 (holding that American Pipe tolling was appro-
priate when property damage claim was involved); Prieto v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 506, 518 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (stating in dicta that Texas courts,
if presented with the issue, would likely interpret the class action tolling rule of Grant
and Bell as extending to all property damage claims, regardless of the forum in which
the class action was filed), abrogated by Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 463 (5th
Cir. 2008).
98. See supra Section II.
99. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974). In any event, the
class action lawsuit would have all the information necessary to determine the subject
matter and size of the potential litigation. Id.
100. American Pipe, 542 F.3d at 538. As stated previously, one federal case inter-
preting Texas law held that Texas courts, if presented with the issue, would interpret
the class action tolling rule of Grant and Bell as extending to all property damage
claims, regardless of the forum in which the class action was filed. Prieto, 132 F. Supp.
2d at 518, abrogated by Newby, 542 F.3d at 472. However, this was merely dicta as the
case did not concern property-related class action lawsuits. Prieto, 132 F. Supp. 2d at
509–11.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-3\TWR303.txt unknown Seq: 17 19-JAN-18 12:43
2018] TEXAS’S CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING RULE 271
related federal class action lawsuit filed in Texas tolls the statute of
limitations applicable to a putative class member’s similar property-
related claim;101 (3) the cases addressing American Pipe and cross-
jurisdictional tolling affirm that property-related cases concern a
“readily discernable” group of claimants and that these cases give the
defendant notice of the type and potential number of claims against it,
unlike the aforementioned mass torts, securities, and personal injury
claims;102 (4) cases examining the scope of cross-jurisdictional tolling
in Texas even indicate that claimants are “free to pursue this argument
with Texas courts,” so the state courts can clarify the reach of Texas’s
tolling rules (indicating Texas’s rule on cross-jurisdictional tolling is
not yet fully developed);103 and (5) the factors weigh in favor of
adopting cross-jurisdictional tolling in the limited circumstances where
property-related claims are involved, like the hypothetical presented
by this Article.104
Therefore, Texas should permit putative class members to use cross-
jurisdictional tolling to toll their Texas property-related claims when
they rely on federal class action lawsuits filed in Texas federal courts
that assert similar Texas property-related claims against a defendant
and to which the Texas statute of limitations applies.
101. See Bell, 899 S.W.2d at 758 (refusing to apply the American Pipe doctrine to a
mass personal injury federal class action lawsuit—premised on non-Texas substantive
law—filed in New Mexico to toll a personal injury claim filed in Texas state court
predicated on Texas substantive law); Vaught, 107 F.3d at 1147 (refusing to apply the
American Pipe doctrine to multiple mass tort federal class action lawsuits—premised
on non-Texas substantive law—filed in Maryland to toll a product liability claim filed
in Texas state court predicated on Texas substantive law); Newby, 542 F.3d at 472
(refusing to apply the American Pipe doctrine to a federal securities class action law-
suit filed in Texas to toll a securities claim filed in Texas state court); In re BP P.L.C.
Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 3d 693, 699–700 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (stating that although “the
Fifth Circuit has cited Bell for the proposition that a federal class action lawsuit likely
cannot toll the state statute of limitations for a claim filed in state court—i.e., that
Texas does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling,” the court “has some doubts that
Bell reaches as far as the Fifth Circuit has intimated.”).
102. Bell, 899 S.W.2d at 758; Vaught, 107 F.3d at 1144–47.
103. Newby, 542 F.3d at 472.
104. See supra Section IV.
